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I. INTRODUCTION
Knudsen correctly

summarizes

(Appellant's Reply Br., p 15)

Simplot's primary arguments

on cross-appeal.

Knudsen even concedes that the gravamen of most of his

Complaint below was a commercial transaction, in that the fraud claims and other claimsincluding the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims-had a commercial
relationship at the center of the claims. (Appellant's Reply Br., pp 24-26) However, Knudsen
argues that the "totality" of his four claims below was not commercial such that fees under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) were awardable, especially where, according to Knudsen, Simplot did not
"apportion" its fees request.
Knudsen suggests that if there was any error by the District Court in not awarding fees to
Simplot under I.C. § 12-120(3), the remedy is remand for additional findings by the District
Court. (Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 22, 27) Alternatively, Knudsen argues, this Court could find
that Simplot was not a prevailing party at all, if it reveres the summary judgment in Simplot' s
favor, and could therefore decline to consider Simplot's cross-appeal. (Appellant's Reply Br., pp
16-17)
Respectfully, the Court should not accept Knudsen's arguments against awarding Simplot
prevailing attorneys' fees.

Simplot prevailed in an action to which I.C. §12-120(3) applied

because no matter what descriptors Plaintiff may have chosen, the case concerned a commercial
transaction. The onus was not on Simplot to make "apportionment" arguments or differentiate
among Plaintiffs pseudonymous claims. In reality, all of Knudsen's claims in his Complaint
were premised upon a commercial transaction.
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entitled to prevailing party fees. It was error and an abuse of discretion for the District Court to
not award fees to Simplot. That decision should be reversed.
II.

REPLY ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

The parties' Briefs demonstrate agreement upon the applicable standards of review.
Compare Simplot's Opening Br., p. 25, and Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 15 and 16.
B. The Attorney Fee Issue is Not Moot.

Citing to Investor Recovery Fund, LLC v. Hopkins, 467 P.3d 406, 409 (2020), Knudsen
invites this Court to reverse the summary judgment in Simplot' s favor and thereafter find that no
prevailing party exists, and the Court need not consider Simplot' s fee appeal. (Appellant's Reply
Br., pp. 16-17)
For all of the reasons set forth in Simplot's Opening/Response Brief, the Court should not
reverse the summary judgment in Simplot's favor, but should affirm the Amended Judgment.
(R., pp. 718-19) (Simplot's Br., pp. 9-25) Because, if the Court affirms the Amended Judgment,
Simplot will be affirmed as the prevailing party, its entitlement to attorney fees stands. See

Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002) ("Actions brought for
breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the
attorney fee provision of I.C. §12-120(3)."). See also Investor Recovery Fund, supra, at 419
("Idaho Code section 12-120(3) ... provides an award of attorney fees for a prevailing party")
(citation omitted).
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The Court should affirm the issues on appeal by Knudsen, and award Simplot fees for the
defense below (and on appeal, as discussed infra).
C. Although Not the Sole Basis for an Award of J.C. §12-120(3) Attorney Fees,
the Fact that Both Parties Requested §12-120(3) Fees is Significant.

Knudsen argues that, while the Court can consider the fact that both parties here
requested fees below on the basis of §12-120(3), which does not mean an award should be
automatic. (Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 17-18) Knudsen cites Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Strata, Inc., 166
Idaho 208, 457 P.3d 860 (2020), which indeed states in part "[t]hat both parties have asked for
attorney fees under section 12-120(3) does not mean such an award is automatically
appropriate." Brunobuilt, supra at 874 (citing Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 326-27, 256
P.3d 730, 734-35 (2011)). However, all Brunobuilt and Soignier mandate is that attorney fees
cannot be awarded under §12-120(3) on the sole basis that both parties requested fees under that
statutory section.
In Brunobuilt, the prevailing party sought fees under §12-120(3), claiming that it was the
third-party beneficiary of a commercial transaction. 457 P.3d at 875. The Court noted that the
commercial transaction relied upon must be between the parties to the lawsuit, which was not
satisfied where fee claimant BrunoBuilt was a mere third party to the commercial transaction.
Id. The Court held "[t]he gravamen of BrunoBuilt 's claims sound in tort, not a commercial

transaction." Id.
Similarly, in Soignier, both parties on appeal requested attorney fees pursuant to §12120(3). The prevailing defendant, an attorney in a legal malpractice case, was awarded such fees
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by the District Court. However, this Court found that the professional negligence claim at issue
between the parties did not arise out of a commercial transaction. Brunobuilt, supra. According
to the Court, the prevailing attorney-defendant therefore did not satisfy the rule that "[t]he
commercial transaction must be integral to and the basis upon which a party is attempting to
recover." Id. Thus, although both parties requested §12-120(3) fees, there was no basis upon
which they could be awarded. Soignier, supra.
Simplot has demonstrated that a commercial transaction was at the heart of the case
between Knudsen and Simplot. Simplot never claimed the sole reason this Court should award it
§12-120(3) attorney fees was because each party requested them in their pleadings below. If
that had been Simplot's argument, Brunobuilt might be instructive. However, Simplot very
clearly demonstrated-and Knudsen does not convincingly contradict-that the gravamen of the
entire case was a commercial transaction and that is the basis upon which Simplot, as prevailing
party, is entitled to §12-120(3) fees.
Still, it is significant that Knudsen also pleaded entitlement to § 12-120(3) fees. "Idaho
courts will consider whether the parties alleged the application of LC. § 12-120." Am. W
Ente1prises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 755, 316 P.3d 662,671 (2013). "Where a party

alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction under Idaho Code §
12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover
attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Lexington Heights Dev., LLC
v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276,287, 92 P.3d 526,537 (2004). Section §12-120(3) was triggered
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here and as the prevailing party, Simplot is entitled to attorney fees, albeit not solely on the basis
that both parties invoked § 12-120(3).

D. Simplot's Position is That It Is Entitled to Prevailing Party Attorney's Fees
Under §12-120(3) for the Defense of All Claims in the Case.
Knudsen suggests that it is Simplot's argument that the District Court should have
apportioned attorney fees among contract- and non-contract-based claims. (Appellant's Reply
Br., p. 18) To the contrary, Simplot's argument has always been that it is entitled to fees for the
defense of the entire case, regardless of how Knudsen may have labeled his various claims,
because the gravamen of the case is a commercial transaction. (R., pp. 464-544) (R., pp. 554641) (Tr. 03.13.19, p. 15, L. 1-10) (Simplot's Br., pp. 34-36)
Notwithstanding this, Simplot noted in the District Court that it was within the Court's
discretion to apportion fees among claims if it found that to be the appropriate course. (Tr.
03 .13 .19, p. 16, L. 12-17) Simplot' s argument in this Court has always remained that it is
entitled to fees for defending all claims. (Simplot's Br., p. 34, p. 36) Nevertheless, Simplot
argued in its Opening Brief-and maintains-that if the District Court was not inclined to grant
fees for the defense of the entire action, it should at least have awarded Simplot its prevailing
party fees for defending the claims denominated as contract/commercial claims. This includes
Knudsen's promissory estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims,
which sound in contract or concern a commercial transaction.

(Knudsen concedes that the

"breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim has a commercial transaction as an
integral part of that claim." (Appellant's Reply Br., p. 26))
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Knudsen argues that Simplot failed to meet its burden to properly assert the grounds upon
which it was seeking an award of attorney's fees, citing Bingham v. Montane Resource

Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999) for this proposition. However, nothing in
Bingham requires "apportionment," as Knudsen appears to suggest it does. As even the Bingham
case language cited by Knudsen demonstrates, all that case requires is that "[i]n order to be
awarded attorney fees, a party must actually assert the specific statute or common law rule on
which the award is based; the district judge cannot sua sponte make the award or grant fees
pursuant to a party's general request." Bingham, supra, at 1039.
In the same vein, the Fournier case quoted by the Bingham Court-and cited by
Knudsen-merely held "[a]t the very least, a statutory or contractual justification for an award of
fees must be advanced below by the party seeking such an award." Fournier v. Fournier, 125
Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct. App. 1994). In Fournier, "[t]he motion did not specify
under which statute it was being filed nor did the request for attorney fees state any statute or
rule upon which the request was made." Bingham, supra, at 1039 (citing Fournier, supra, at
602).
That is patently not the case here, where Simplot repeatedly cited §12-120(3) as the basis
for its entitlement to fees below. (R., pp. 465-66, p. 554, pp. 558-61) (Tr. 03.13.19, p. 15, L. 1-6)
Certainly, as required by Bingham, the "request for attorney fees ... alert[ed] the other party to
the basis upon which attorney fees are requested in order that the other party may have a
sufficient opportunity to object" and "to raise relevant facts and legal principles in its defense."

Bingham, supra. Bingham was satisfied here.
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Still, Knudsen claims that, under Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577
(2001) and Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 910 P.2d 744 (1996), no fees can be
awarded to Simplot because of its supposed failure to apportion §12-120(3) fees between
qualifying claims and non-qualifying claims. (Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 19-20) However,
Rockefeller and Brooks are inapposite.

In Brooks, "[t]he basis of the Gigray Ranches' [counter]claim was the tort of
conversion." Brooks, supra, at 751. And in Rockefeller, the Court noted that the District Court
had been unable to "apportion those fees that were incurred in using the breach of fiduciary duty
issue as a contract defense from those incurred in using the breach issue as a tort counterclaim."
Rockefeller, supra, at 585. There is no similar circumstance in the present case, where Simplot

did not raise a counterclaim for which it is seeking to recover fees. All the fees Simplot is
seeking to recover are for the defense of Knudsen's claims, which arise from the purported
breach of his employment agreement. "Actions brought for breach of an employment contract
are considered commercial transactions under Idaho Code section 12-120(3)." Campbell v.
Parlnvay Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho 957,969,354 P.3d 1172, 1184 (2015).

In a case distinguishing Brooks, this Court noted:
That analysis does not apply here because all of the claims asserted in this
litigation were to recover in a commercial transaction, for which the prevailing
party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. I.C. § 12-120(3). Where one party
has been determined to be the overall prevailing party in the litigation and by
statute or contract the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees on
all claims asserted in the litigation, the award of reasonable attorney fees is not
required to be limited to the claims upon which the prevailing party prevailed.
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Advanced Med. Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. of Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 815-16, 303

P.3d 171, 174-75 (2013).
Apportionment by Simplot of its claim for fees was not required. All that was required
was that Simplot appraise the District Court and Knudsen of the basis upon which Simplot was
moving for fees, which Simplot did.

The District Court need not even have apportioned

Simplot' s fees between Plaintiffs claims, and Simplot argued both below and in its Opening
Brief in this Court that it was actually entitled to the entirety of it fees for defending against all of
Knudsen's claims. Simplot's only argument as to apportionment was that the District Court
should not have wholesale denied fees but should, if it felt some of the claims raised did not
qualify Simplot to fees under §12-120(3), have awarded fees to Simplot for prevailing on the
clearly contractual/commercial claims.

E. The District Court Erred in Not Awarding Simplot Attorney Fees Where the
Gravamen of the Complaint was a Commercial Transaction and Simplot
Prevailed.

Knudsen contends that "at least half of Knudsen's claims are not grounded in commercial
transactions, and Simplot provided no basis for the lower court to apportion attorney fees."
(Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 21-22) He argues that this Court may affirm the District Court's
decision not to grant Simplot any fees pursuant to §12-120(3) "when only half of the claims fall
within the reach of the statute, and where Simplot failed to adequately present an apportionment
argument." (Appellant's Reply Br., p. 27) Knudsen's apportionment arguments are addressed in
Section D. Additionally, all of Knudsen's Complaint's claims were based upon a commercial
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transaction, such that the prevailing party-Simplot-should have been awarded attorney fees
under §12-120(3).
1. The Gravamen of Knudsen's Claims Here Was Inarguably a Commercial
Transaction.

Knudsen points out that for a party to recover its attorney fees under §12-120(3), the
gravamen of the claim must be a commercial transaction. (Appellant's Reply Br., p. 20) That is
satisfied here. "Actions on employment contracts are subject to the attorney fee provisions of§
12-120(3)." Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,492,
20 P.3d 21, 28 (Ct. App. 2001). See also Atwood v. W. Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479
(Ct. App. 1996), holding:
We conclude that actions on employment contracts are subject to the attorney fee
provisions of I.C. § 12-120(3). Consequently, [defendant] should be granted
attorney fees it incurred in successfully defending against [employee's] claims for
breach of express and implied contract terms, including the claim for violation of
the implied covenant of good faith.
Atwood, supra, at 486. See also Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Center, LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 969,

354 P.3d 1172, 1184 (2015) (affirming award of§ 12-120(3) attorney's fees to prevailing party in
breach of employment contract case, on basis of commercial transaction); Oakes v. Boise Heart
Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,547,272 P.3d 512, 519 (2012) ("Since the gravamen of

this action is the breach of an employment contract, § 12-120(3) is an applicable ground for the
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party."); Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho
388, 399, 257 P.3d 755, 767 (2011) ("Actions for breach of an employment contract are
considered commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-
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120(3)."); Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (same);

Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 842, 41 P.3d 263,270 (2002) (same).
As Knudsen alleged in his Complaint, "[t]his lawsuit arises from Simplot's recruitment,
hire, employment, and ultimate termination of Mr. Knudsen." (R., p. 9) This was a commercial
transaction, subject to the attorney fee provision of LC. § 12-120(3 ).

2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding the Action Did Not
Warrant Attorney Fees.
The District Court found that the case "sounds in the -- a hybrid nature of fraud, and not
in the nature of contract action that would warrant attorneys' fees." (Tr. 03.13.19, p. 19, L. 1-5)
Knudsen argues that this finding should be upheld because "at least half' of Knudsen's claims
are not "grounded in commercial transactions ... "

(Appellant's Reply Br., p. 21)

This is

incorrect, as all of Knudsen's claims arise from a commercial relationship and transaction, and
the Court should have so found.

a. The Fraud Claim
Knudsen concedes that the gravamen of his fraud claim is a commercial transaction.
(Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 22-25) He is correct. See Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141
Idaho 362, 368-69, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110-11 (2005) (finding cattle buyer's claims, including
fraud claim, arose within the commercial context, and thus bank, as prevailing party, was entitled
to §12-120(3) attorney fees and costs).

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL- IO

SIMPLOT'S

REPLY

BRIEF

ON

CROSS

b. The Promissory Estoppel Claim
Knudsen maintains that, since it is an equitable claim, his promissory estoppel claim is
not founded upon a "transaction," and a commercial transaction is not integral to the claim, so
prevailing party fees under §12-120(3) are not recoverable.

(Appellant's Reply Br., p. 25)

Knudsen relies upon SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner Cnty., 164 Idaho 786, 435 P.3d
1106 (2019). Silver Wing is inapposite, however.
In that case, "even though the parties had a commercial relationship, they never
consummated a commercial transaction for purposes of Idaho Code section 12-120(3)." 164
Idaho at 800, 435 P.3d at 1120 (emphasis in original).

Conversely, Knudsen and Simplot

indubitably entered into a transaction for purposes of § 12-120(3).

"The term 'commercial

transaction' is defined in § 12-120(3) as 'all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes."' Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423, 111 P.3d 100,
108 (2005).

A job offer, and the acceptance of that offer, and the resulting employment

relationship, is transactions not for personal or household purposes, but the gravamen of which is
a commercial transaction. Id.
In Lettunich, supra, this Court found that all of the plaintiffs claims, including his claims
for promissory estoppel, arose within the commercial context, for purposes of the award of § 12120(3) fees. Id. The same is true here.

c. The Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
As with the fraud claim, Knudsen acknowledges that the gravamen of his breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is a commercial transaction. (Appellant's Reply
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Br., pp. 21, 25) This is accurate. See Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho
912,921, 188 P.3d 854,863 (2008) (finding for purposes of award of fees under LC. §12-120(3),
"counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of
contract claim.")
d. The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Knudsen contends that there is no appellate case holding that a negligent infliction of
emotional distress tort would be considered a commercial transaction. (Appellant's Reply Br., p.
26) While this may be far as true as it goes, the fact is, where, as here, the emotional distress
claims were tied to the fraud claims, §12-120(3) fees are recoverable. As Knudsen
acknowledges, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim alleged that Simplot breached
a duty not to commit fraud. (Appellant's Opening Br., pp. 35-36) (Appellant's Reply Br., p. 26)
Knudsen concedes, now, that the gravamen of his fraud claim is a commercial transaction.
(Appellant's Reply Br., pp. 22-25) Since fees under § 12-120(3) are awardable to Simplot for
prevailing on Knudsen's fraud claim, such fees are also available for defeating Knudsen's
parasitic negligent infliction of emotional distress claim premised upon that fraud claim.
III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

"This was an action to recover in a commercial transaction, and the statute applies even if
the only issue on appeal involves the award of attorney fees below." Advanced Med.
Diagnostics, supra (awarding prevailing party appellate attorney fees).

Of course, fees were not the only issue on appeal here; as Simplot argued in its Opening
Brief, the Court should affirm the Amended Judgment in Simplot' s favor and should find that
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Simplot, as the prevailing party on appeal, is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. See
LC. §12-120(3); I.A.R. 4l(a); Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,461,259 P.3d 595,
607 (2011) (finding entitlement to appellate attorney fees in commercial transaction case).
If Simplot prevails on appeal, it should also be awarded prevailing party costs under

I.A.R. 40(a).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, and the arguments made in its Opening Brief on Cross Appeal,
Simplot requests the Court to vacate the District Court's ruling denying Simplot attorney's fees
on the basis of LC. § 12-120(3) and remand to the District Court for the award of such fees; to
find that Simplot is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §12-120(3), to remand to
the District Court to fix such fees; and to award Simplot prevailing party costs in this appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a).
Respectfully submitted and DATED this

qC day of September, 2020.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By
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1516 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID. 83702
T: (208) 336-1788
F: (208) 278-3708
E: erika@Idahojobjustice.com
guy@Idahojobjustice.com
lourdes@Idahojobjustice.com

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail
iCourt/e-File

Attorneys for Appellant/CrossRespondent

£~

Bnan K. Julian

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL-14

SIMPLOT'S

REPLY

BRIEF

ON

CROSS

